4–4-fuckin’-2

As we’re firmly lodged in the perineum of the international break — that awkward phase between the end of the national team fixtures and the start of club football — now seems a good time to reflect back on the first few weeks of the new season.

It’s far too early to look at the underlying numbers and draw any definitive conclusions about teams from a statistical perspective, but it’s not too soon to take note of tactical trends and there’s one that has stuck out like a sore thumb so far: 4–4–2 is back in vogue again in a big way.

Watford, Bournemouth, Palace, Brighton, Southampton, Burnley, West Ham, and Spurs have all played variations of it so far this season and a case can be made that Newcastle and Leicester’s 4–2–3–1s essentially function as a 4–4–2. The top four in Spain last season all played 4–4–2 at points, as well.

A lot of these sides seem to feature converted wingers (Wilfried Zaha, Lucas Moura, Marko Arnautović, Antoine Griezmann, Josh King) who play upfront off a more typical central striker. It’s a good way of accommodating those sorts of players — it lets them contribute defensively by using their pace to press the opposition CBs, without requiring them to track back which is useful as a failure to track runners is often what disrupts defensive structure the most. It also means that when the team does win the ball back, they have their most dangerous players higher up the pitch, making it easier to transition from defence to attack quickly.

The other benefit is that it lets you play with creative wide midfielders rather than conventional wingers. If one or both of the two strikers are capable of running the channels, it drags defenders out of position and vacates the centre of the pitch, so those wide midfielders can drift inside, where they have more space to operate in than if they start centrally and have to receive passes in a congested area.

The whole system is dependent on having players in central midfield who either have a good engine or are positionally disciplined/tactically aware, which is where West Ham have struggled so far. Watford’s pairing of Doucouré/Capoue provides an energy and dynamism that suits the way they try to press their opposition relatively high up the pitch and it gives Watford the option to progress the ball up the pitch by carrying it, rather than playing out from the back extensively. The Westwood/Cork and Stephens/Pröpper duos at Burnley and Brighton are less mobile, but their roles are more about retaining positioning and spacing within the defensive shape in deeper-lying systems that focus on winning the ball back within their own defensive third. Then there’s the Rakitic/Busquets offering who compensate for their lack of direct athleticism with their awareness and intelligent passing and that allows Barça to play a more possession heavy variant.

Part of the appeal of the return of 4–4–2 is seeing the different interpretations different managers have. Although each of these sides are utilising the same basic template, there’s plenty of variety between them as coaches tweak the shape to suit certain personnel or game plans.

Watford:

Bournemouth:

and Southampton:

all play with comparatively high defensive lines as they attempt to put pressure on the ball in the opposition half and generally seek to assert themselves on their opponent when they’re in possession.

In contrast, Brighton:

Newcastle:

and Atlético:

operate in a deeper shape where there’s less emphasis on aggressively pressing the ball high up the pitch, and more emphasis on retaining defensive discipline and playing reactive football by moving quickly through the phases on the counter with direct passing.

Beyond the distinctions between high and low defensive lines within this groups of 4–4–2 adherents, there’s also a rough split when it comes to their attitude to ball retention: Barça, Bournemouth, Southampton, and (theoretically) West Ham looking to play possession dominant football, whereas Watford, Brighton, and Newcastle are quite happy to relinquish control of the ball for long periods of the game.

Palace tend to play on the deeper side of things but there’s a lot of nuance to what Roy’s done at Selhurst Park. When Zaha roams out to the left to find space, there’s a sort of pendulum effect on the rest of the team’s shape — Townsend pushes up on the right, the two CMs shuffle across, and the left winger tucks in to make it a 3 in midfield. Because Ruben Loftus-Cheek is such a good ball carrier, last season he could drive forward to make it a 4–2–3–1, but they’ve not really had that with Schlupp on the left so far. It seems likely that will be where Max Meyer will slot in, so it’ll be curious to see what sort of role he does from there.

A lot of these formations are widely described as 4–4–1–1 and while I can understand that notation, especially with a shape like Brighton’s where Pascal Groß plays off Glenn Murray, I don’t really think that’s a distinction worth making. Even the teams like Watford, Southampton and Burnley who play with two “standard” strikers will have one of them (Deeney/Ings/Barnes) drop off deeper to link with midfield. The number 10 rarely plays in the midfield line when these teams are out of possession so it makes more sense to me to clump them with the striker.

I’m mostly just glad that mid-table sides have reverted to back fours. I got so bored of watching two teams with 3 CBs playing each other last year because you’d end up with 6 or 7 defensively minded outfield players on each side and the game would descend into being a proper slog.

So far in the Premier League the 4–4–2 revival has been restricted to midtable clubs — Tottenham quickly abandoned the Uruguay-style diamond they used in their victory against United as they switched to a back 3 in order to work Toby Alderweireld back into the fold — and it’ll be interesting to see whether any of the big boys start using it on a more regular basis.

Sarri seems wedded to his 4–3–3 shape, so he’s out and, with things coming apart at the seams a bit at United, it’s impossible to predict what we’ll get out of Mourinho in the near future. Klopp appears to be similarly committed to his 4–3–3 system but the arrival of Xherdan Shaqiri gives him the option of shifting Mo Salah into the frontline alongside Roberto Firmino. It’s probably unlikely beyond situations where they’re chasing a game or on the odd occasions when they’re faced with an extremely low-block team, but it’s an intriguing option. Meanwhile, Benjamin Mendy’s return has enabled City to experiment with a 3–5–2 to accommodate both Gabriel Jesus and Sergio Agüero, but it seems unlikely that Pep will go 4–4–2 for any extended period of time and Poch seemingly favours having all 3 of his premium CBs on the pitch together at the same time which discounts them, although the return of Son from international duty might give him pause.

All of which leaves Arsenal as perhaps the most likely adopters. Everyone with half a brain can see that finding a way to getting Lacabameyang onto the pitch together is the way forward for Arsenal, but the trick for Emery is finding a way to incorporate both Ramsey and Özil into the side along the two frontmen. If he can crack that nut without completely upsetting the balance of the side, then a 4–4–2 will surely be more beneficial than shoehoring Aubameyang on the left wing like they have so far.

Regardless, 4–4–2 is back and it doesn’t look like it’s going anywhere fast.